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The paper concludes that the treaty has not achieved what its supporters claim. In fact the treaty is an arms control agreement that: (1) is not remotely related to its original purpose; (2) has reinforced NATO military inferiority; and (3) may have laid the groundwork for the unraveling of the Atlantic Alliance.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY:
HISTORY OF AN ILLUSIONAn Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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ABSTRACT

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Introduction

In the International Society as we know it, security is not provided by the concentration of military power in an authority superior to sovereign states, but rests on a balance of power among them.

Hedley Bull, 1976

On December 8, 1987 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed a treaty providing for the elimination of American and Soviet long-range and short-range intermediate nuclear forces. The Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty eliminates 867 American and 1836 Soviet missiles from NATO and Warsaw Pact arsenals by the end of 1991 with intrusive verification measures to be employed over the following decade.¹ The treaty has been hailed as the most important arms control agreement in the cold war era, representing the first negotiated reversal of the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons. Former Secretary of State George Shultz stated that "...historians may come to see the INF experience as one of NATO's finest hours."² Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated that "...the INF treaty is a victory of allied cohesion and resolve."³ Ambassador Max Kampelman, former Head of the U.S. Delegation on Nuclear Talks in Geneva has said that "...the treaty stands on its own as a contribution to our security."⁴

The thesis of this paper is that the INF treaty is an illusion. It is an illusion not because of what it has or has not achieved, but because it is a treaty in which the ends themselves became the sole focus of its negotiators. The illusion exists because it promotes the notion that Western security can be easily

and cheaply assured by arms control agreements rather than by strong defenses. My purpose is to demonstrate that the INF treaty, an agreement in the making for over 12 years, is the result of a number of disconnected and illogical decisions. The result is an arms control agreement that: (1) is not remotely related to its original purpose; (2) has reinforced NATO military inferiority; and (3) may have laid the groundwork for the unraveling of the Atlantic Alliance. My methodology will be to examine the chronology of events leading to the signing of the treaty and the military and political impacts of the treaty. I will also outline some future implications, draw conclusions and make recommendations for NATO's future.

CHRONOLOGY

To understand the INF treaty it is necessary to first examine the evolution of NATO's deterrent strategy primarily because nuclear weapons have played such an important role in that strategy. It is equally important to examine the evolution of the treaty itself in order to be able to place key decisions in perspective.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 following the end of a long and bitter world war. The basis for its formation can be traced to American and West European desires to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence and domination in Europe. NATO's initial exclusive reliance on American nuclear weapons quickly came under criticism in 1949 as the Soviet Union emerged as a nuclear power; followed by United States involvement

in Korea in 1950. Both of these events seemed to clear away a need for stronger conventional forces. In 1951 NATO adopted the Lisbon force goals which called for 96 NATO divisions by 1954, half of which were to be active component divisions.¹ Allied governments soon had to face the economic difficulties of this decision and were forced to return to the American nuclear umbrella. This return to maximum deterrence at an affordable cost, or as others have put it, "defense on the cheap" led to what was termed the American "new look" in deterrent strategy.² President Eisenhower believed that American forces could not be forward deployed around the world in order to meet every threat. Instead he asserted that a strong national economy was the true key to American security. In 1954 John Foster Dulles unveiled the strategy of massive retaliation. Dulles stated the United States would depend "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing, as the major deterrent to aggression large or small."³ This was followed by National Security Council Directive 162/2 in which the President directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to plan to use "nuclear armaments of all types in the event of general or local war."⁴ In 1956 the North Atlantic Council formally adopted massive retaliation in Military Committee document MC 14/2.⁵ The strategy came under direct attack at the outset. Probably its most notable and vociferous critic was Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor favored a more balanced approach with a wide range of forces that could be employed at any level of conflict. He believed that overreliance

on the nuclear response with continued cuts in conventional forces would reduce the American forces in Europe to small atomic fire forces." Taylor was overruled by Eisenhower and throughout the Eisenhower years the American nuclear stockpile, to include tactical nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe, continued to grow as conventional forces grew smaller.

The emphasis on nuclear weapons by the Eisenhower administration became a major political issue during the 1960 presidential campaign. John Kennedy favored military options which would give him more to choose from than total annihilation or surrender. The first step in developing these options had already been taken in 1957 when the SACEUR, General Norstad proposed the development of a limited war fighting capability. In 1959, General Taylor published his book calling for the development of the "strategy of flexible response" in order to provide "a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war to local infiltrations and aggressions."¹¹ Following his election, President Kennedy set about the task of correcting what he considered to be serious errors in overreliance on nuclear weapons made by the Eisenhower administration. In 1962 Defense Secretary McNamara publically unveiled the new administration's strategy in a speech which clearly reflected a greater emphasis on conventional forces and deemphasized the "trip-wire" strategy of massive retaliation. McNamara also criticized the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom. The European reaction was less than

enthusiastic as they now feared the United States was not going to conventional confrontation on European soil. DeGaulle was reportedly to have reacted to McNamara's speech by saying that no U.S. President will exchange Chicago for Lyon.¹² Five more years of debate ensued, including the withdrawal of France from the NATO integrated military structure, before the Alliance finally adopted flexible response in MC 14/3.

That the strategy of flexible response has survived for more than 20 years is not altogether surprising, when one understands it was adopted as a compromise in both military and political terms. Militarily it was a compromise between the trip-wire strategy of massive retaliation and full scale conventional defense. Politically it was a compromise between U.S. desires to build strong conventional forces and European desires for continued reliance on a direct nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The common ground was ambiguity. One of the drafters of MC 14/3 notes, "whatever its defects, flexible response was so flexible that it could be interpreted in any way - it had to be or it wouldn't have been adopted. It was quite a considerable achievement to produce a text which people could agree to as a foundation for the development of operational concepts and force structure."¹³

The strategy of flexible response calls for: (1) direct defense to defeat an attack placing the burden of escalation on the aggressor; (2) deliberate escalation by NATO which includes the possible first use of nuclear weapons, and (3) a general nuclear

recourse.¹ The theory behind this strategy is that it should put NATO with a wide range of possible responses to an attack by the Warsaw Pact. It also allows NATO to respond to changes in doctrine and operational concepts developed by the Warsaw Pact. In order to implement the strategy, NATO is required to maintain adequate forces at each level of the triad: strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional forces.

For the strategy to remain viable, NATO must be able to credibly threaten escalation at each level. While this does not require that NATO achieve superiority at each level, its inability to maintain "adequate" forces would severely undermine the escalation process. By threatening escalation, the strategy is designed to end hostilities at the lowest possible level.

It is generally agreed that the birthplace of the INF treaty was in a 1977 speech by then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the International Institute of Strategic Studies.² In his speech Schmidt warned that the credibility of NATO's deterrent was in jeopardy, particularly in light of the recent Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles on Eastern European soil. Schmidt pointed out that the Soviets had already reached parity at the strategic level following a rapid buildup in the 60s and 70s. This strategic parity put the Soviet Union in the position to hold the U.S. in check while it relied on its superior conventional and newly acquired intermediate nuclear forces to completely intimidate western Europe.

The SS-20 had an improved range and accuracy over the SS-4 and

SS-20 missiles it was replacing, and it could be moved around to the battlefield on mobile platforms. In addition, the SS-20 was armed with three warheads that could be independently targeted and delivered.¹² The SS-20 had no NATO counterpart, thereby creating a Soviet monopoly in theater nuclear forces. The net effect was a tremendous gap in NATO's deterrent strategy.

NATO planners had, since the early seventies, agreed that a gap favoring the Soviets already existed at the conventional level. Now, another gap had developed at the level of theater nuclear forces and the alarm was sounded that the Soviets were in the position to use their power to blackmail Western Europe. Schmidt's speech was the catalyst for rapid action to correct this imbalance. Immediately following Schmidt's speech, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) directed that a High Level Group (HLG) be established to conduct a study of Alliance INF modernization needs that would be consistent with the doctrine of flexible response.¹³ One way to solve the nuclear imbalance would be to impose limits on the number of SS-20s and Backfire bombers that could be deployed. It was hoped that these limits could be imposed through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Another method would be for NATO to deploy its own new weapons to take away the Soviet monopoly at the intermediate level. It is widely agreed that Chancellor Schmidt was not interested in matching Soviet deployments missile for missile. His principle concern was a guarantee that the U.S. would not abandon its allies in a European conflict. What Schmidt envisioned was an American made missile, land based on West

European soil, that could reach into the Soviet Union. Faced with an attack on the countries where these weapons were to be based, the U.S. would have to use them or lose them. By using them directly against the Soviet Union, the U.S. would be coupling its military response to the defense of Europe.¹³

During the initial stages it was the European members of the High Level Group who pushed hard for the introduction of new American missiles on European soil, to counter the threat imposed by the SS-20s. Ironically, it was the American delegation which resisted this proposal on the grounds that Warsaw Pact targets were already adequately covered by existing nuclear systems.¹⁴ As the European members continued to push for deployment, it became apparent that the deployment issue was not merely a military one. It was also clearly becoming a political issue and the European members were looking for some tangible sign of confidence from the United States.

Following the neutron bomb fiasco in 1978, the Carter administration realized that military considerations were secondary to the political necessities of healing some very deep wounds within the Alliance.¹⁵ Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski stated, long after the decision was made to deploy American missiles on West European soil, that he never really supported the deployment on military grounds:

I was persuaded reluctantly that we needed [them] to obtain European support for SALT. This was largely because Chancellor Schmidt made such a big deal out of the so-called Euro-Strategic imbalance that was being

generated by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. To keep him in line we felt that some response in Europe in the intermediate level would be necessary.¹

In the summer of 1979 the High Level Group and the newly formed Special Consultative Group on Arms Control (SCG) produced two diverging reports on the situation facing NATO. The High Level Group recommended deployment of American missiles on European soil for military reasons, and selected the Pershing II (PII) and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM). PII and GLCM were chosen for a number of reasons. Their ranges (1800 and 2500 kilometers) were adequate for striking targets deep into the Soviet homeland. Both systems would be land based, presenting a more visible symbol of American commitment to its European allies. And lastly, it was reasoned that an American President would be more inclined to authorize the use of these weapons, because a theater strike would be less likely to trigger a strategic exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.² The SCG proposed arms control initiatives that were aimed at eliminating the need for any deployment. At a summit meeting in Guadeloupe, attended by President Carter, President Giscard d'Estaing, Prime Minister James Callaghan and Chancellor Schmidt, Giscard proposed combining both deployment and arms control in one initiative.³ Carter liked the idea so much that he adopted it as his own. Shortly thereafter, the results of the HLG and SCG were simply "stapled" together and became known as the Integrated Decision Document (IDD).⁴ The Alliance had thus found a way to make the deployment of new nuclear systems not only

compatible with, but necessary, to, an arms control agreement with Soviets. The phrase, "bargaining from a position of strength" was now added to the American arms control lexicon and would soon become the slogan for American and European political and military leaders.

The IDD was presented to the NATO ministers in December, 1979. It emerged publicly as the now famous "dual-track" decision of December, 1979. The Alliance was now committed to the deployment of new American missiles along one track, while the U.S. simultaneously pursued reductions in Soviet missiles along the other.

The connection between the two tracks was clear, at least in theory: if the Soviets were sufficiently forthcoming in accepting negotiated limitations on their intermediate-range forces, and in particular the SS-20, the West might not introduce all 572 of its own new missiles.²⁵

As time passed, Alliance leaders found it easier to explain the need for modernizing nuclear forces as a direct response to Soviet SS-20s instead of the intended purpose of eliminating the huge gap in NATO's strategy of flexible response. After the Reagan administration came into power it found itself hopelessly entrenched in one squabble after another over the correct approach to take regarding the dual-track decision. To make matters worse, European governments were pressing the new administration for a firm date to resume SALT with the Soviets. At the same time hundreds of thousands of Europeans had taken to the streets to protest the inevitable stationing of a new class of nuclear weapons

on their soil. Surprisingly enough, the overall tone of the message was decidedly more anti-American than anti-Soviet. This new situation appeared on the horizon as another possible advantage for the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could drive another wedge between the U.S. and its allies, they could walk away with the ultimate prize - halt the deployment of the feared PII and GLCM, and possibly decouple the U.S. from the Atlantic Alliance.

The Reagan administration ultimately turned to a proposal made in early 1981 by Chancellor Schmidt. Schmidt reasoned that if the Soviets agreed to remove all of their intermediate range forces, then the American deployment would not be necessary. Schmidt's proposal was termed Null-Losuing or the "zero solution."³⁵ For nearly nine months debate raged within the Reagan administration over the zero option. Although in the end both the State Department and the Defense Department endorsed the zero option, they both preferred significantly different versions. The State Department was more in favor of the original dual track proposal. Secretary of State Haig wanted to accommodate the Europeans. As the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), he understood the operational necessity of modernizing NATO's nuclear forces. Richard Perle, the Defense Department's point man on INF, had not supported the dual track decision in the first place. Perle felt the decision was a mistake. He termed the decision a "marginal military fix" and ridiculed a decision that would involve paying "billions of dollars for a mere 572 weapons."³⁶ Perle remarked "...the whole sorry story is a classic example of how so-called

arms control), far from controlling arms, has had the effect of driving the deployment of new weapons. So the Defense Department decided that, if the Allies wanted this decision, they could have it. "When it failed, they would be party to the failure, just as they had been party to what Perle saw as the folly of the December 1979 decision."¹⁸

It was at this stage in the treaty's evolution that the most important aspect of the deployment decision was lost. The original decision did not in any way imply that successful arms control would lead to the cancellation of PII and GLCM deployment. In fact the Integrated Decision Document clearly stated that the "arms control track should not overtake the deployment track..."¹⁹ In other words the dual track desision should lead to "some deployment and some arms control."²⁰ It is also at this point that the original objective for modernization of theater nuclear forces started to become more and more obscure, only to become lost in subsequent political debates.

In November, 1981, just prior to the first round of INF negotiations in Geneva, President Reagan unveiled the U.S. version of the zero option proposal in a speech at the National Press Club. The President offered to forego deployment of PII and GLCM, if the Soviets would eliminate their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The President stressed that the zero option solution would eliminate an entire class of American and Soviet nuclear weapons.²¹ Reagan's proposal was viewed in Europe as nothing more than a political ploy. Although it was reluctantly endorsed, the feeling in Europe

was that the proposal ran counter to the spirit of the existing deployment decision of December 1979. Many in the United States and Europe who ultimately endorsed the proposal comforted themselves by believing that there was no chance that the Soviets would ever accept the zero option. But by November, 1983 as components of the first U.S. cruise missiles began arriving in Great Britain and West Germany, the Soviet position began to change dramatically. Although the Soviets walked out of the INF talks following deployment of the cruise missiles, the real issue of deciding what concessions would be necessary to ensure zero inventories of PII and GLCM remained. As PII and GLCM deployments continued over the next two years, it became evident that the Soviets were willing to trade SS-20 missiles that could "...only strike America's allies for U.S. missiles that could strike Soviet soil."¹² NATO found itself bracing for a dilemma they had not imagined.

In a November, 1985 meeting, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to focus on an interim INF agreement. In a January, 1986 letter to Reagan, Gorbachev proposed the complete elimination of nuclear weapons over a 15 year period and agreed to exclude British and French nuclear forces. NATO now found itself in a difficult position. In order to avoid appearing hypocritical by wishing to back out of the zero option proposal, NATO now raised three additional problems that they stipulated had to be resolved before an agreement could be reached. These were the issues of short-range intermediate nuclear forces (SRINF),

Soviet missiles in Asia and the most difficult of all issues, verification.

A problem with eliminating long range theater nuclear forces was that their targets could be covered by shorter range systems. The U.S. position was that SRINF should be included in the INF talks. Gorbachev again caught everyone off guard by proposing that the SRINF should also be reduced to zero. NATO was now faced with a double-zero option and total confusion ensued among European governments. Political and military leaders began to question the wisdom of eliminating the second leg of NATO's triad. General Bernard Rogers, stated at the time, "...I am concerned that...the long-term credibility of NATO's deterrent is being sacrificed by this treaty on the altar of short term political expediency." He further said, "the treaty puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe...."³³

The United States had no short range missiles that were deployed in Europe. Germany operated 72 Pershing IA missiles under a dual key arrangement, but it had not been a participant in the reduction talks and could not be forced to remove the Pershing IAs if it chose not to. In fact, Germany's Defense Minister Manfred Woerner argued that NATO should increase its inventory of shorter range forces by deploying an improved version of the Pershing IA - the Pershing IB. Woerner shared General Rogers' concern that NATO was unquestionably headed towards denuclearization. But, he was able to muster little support among Allied leaders.³⁴ Since the first zero had already been agreed upon, it was impossible to make

a date for a nuclear deterrence. The issue of the Pershing 1. On 21 August, 1987, Chancellor Kohl announced that West Germany would dismantle its 72 Pershing IA missiles as the last stumbling block in the INF treaty process.¹

There exists today, strong sentiment in Europe to go still further - a third zero. The argument is that since the remaining tactical nuclear weapon systems, all with ranges below 500 kilometers, will fall only on German soil (this includes East Germany) these weapons should be removed as well. If the third zero is adopted, existing Warsaw Pact advantages in conventional and chemical arms will only be enhanced.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPACT

The European missile agreement goes too far, yet it does not go far enough. It eliminates a vital part of NATO's deterrent before we have assured that other parts of the deterrent can bear the increased burden.

Alexander Haig, 1987

Its supporters claim that the INF treaty is an arms control breakthrough of monumental proportions. It includes on-site inspections inside the Soviet Union as well as the ability to permanently monitor Soviet compliance. It eliminates over four times as many Soviet warheads as American. It imposes a world wide ban on the highly mobile Soviet SS-20 missile, and as Secretary of State has said, "It strengthens U.S. and allied security and...enhances international stability."² With all of these benefits could there possibly be any adverse military or political consequences?

There are those who contend that the treaty has had a negative military impact on NATO. In fact the JCS position is that the treaty, "...is in the best interests of the United States and its allies...and has little impact on NATO's fundamental strategy."³⁷ However, General Bernard Rogers has publicly stated that, "...NATO will be eliminating both of the credible LRINF escalatory options between its conventional forces and the strategic nuclear forces, returning NATO to its posture in 1979."³⁸

The fact is that the treaty has eliminated an important rung in NATO's escalatory ladder. The result is that NATO is left with an ineffective and obsolete inventory of nuclear systems that eliminates the SACEUR's ability to strike militarily significant targets in the Soviet Union with nuclear systems. What he is left with is hundreds of artillery fired atomic projectiles (AFAP) with a range of about nine miles. Because they must be deployed at sufficient distances behind our own forward line of troops (FLOT) these projectiles will only fall on NATO soil. The proximity of these nuclear capable artillery systems poses another problem in that they can be overrun before being used. There are 88 LANCE ballistic missile launchers, with a range of about 66 miles, which must be located even farther to the rear of the FLOT to reduce their vulnerability.³⁹ They are capable of reaching only to the western edge of East Germany. There are hundreds of nuclear bombs which can be delivered by NATO's 1500 dual capable aircraft (DCA). This is contingent upon the notion that they will not already be overcommitted to conventional close air support and interdiction

missions, and that they will be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses. DCA can engage only a minimal number of targets per sortie, (there are about 1800 nuclear targets identified for DCA within NATO), they are range limited, and they have limited capability at night and in inclement weather.³ They are also tied to a few vulnerable airbases which might be rendered inoperable early in the fight. The use of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), as some have proposed, is no substitute for theater ground based systems. Strategic planners worry that assigning the Trident, D5 missile to NATO will allow important Soviet targets to go uncovered.⁴ Additionally, it is feared the Soviets will perceive the use of SLBM as part of a strategic strike and will respond with a strike against the United States. It is widely believed that the use of a theater nuclear system is more likely to lead to an end to hostilities rather than escalate to a strategic exchange.

If the strategic and theater nuclear legs of the NATO triad have been made less effective, what has been the impact of the INF treaty on the final leg - conventional forces? If anything, the treaty has served to highlight the critical need to strengthen NATO's conventional posture. Yet it is in the conventional area that improvements are least likely to be addressed either through modernization or arms control. Conventional force improvements have little chance of success in light of current economic constraints. National contributions to NATO are more likely to shrink than to grow over the next several years. Between 1980 and

Italy, UK, Canada, Britain, Greece, Italy, Norway and the United States were able to meet the agreed upon goal of a per cent annual real growth.¹⁷ In 1988 only Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey increased real defense spending. Additionally, NATO's long standing practice of funding anything other than minimal conventional force improvements is not likely to change. The United States has sought improvements since the early 1960s in an effort to build a conventional force capable of significantly raising the nuclear threshold (forcing the burden of escalation to the other side). European leaders have resisted the American effort partly for fear of decoupling the U.S. strategic deterrent from European defense. There is no reason to believe that conventional imbalances will not continue to be tolerated, even in light of the possible denuclearization of Europe. There is also little hope that future arms control negotiations will help to correct the imbalances. Instead, they are more likely to strain the cohesion of the Alliance in light of recent attractive Soviet proposals.

The sad fact is that NATO has not been able to reach a consensus on the long term implications for conventional deterrence and defense in the aftermath of the INF treaty.

If the military impact of the INF treaty on NATO is significant, the political impact is potentially fatal. Most experts agree that in the aftermath of INF, theater nuclear forces must be modernized. The follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) is considered particularly critical. Yet, even with modernization, West Germany

will again be forced into the reality of seeing the world as a battlefield for nuclear war. The pressure on the German government is such for the elimination of all nuclear systems will continue to build, especially in preparation for next year's election. If Chancellor Kohl is forced to officially pursue the denuclearization of West German territory, not only will NATO strategy be placed in jeopardy, cracks in NATO's political future may become irreparable. Moscow is not unaware of this situation and will continue to sway European public opinion by offering to make additional unilateral cuts in conventional and nuclear forces in Eastern Europe. Both of these proposals will reinforce West European resistance to the modernization of NATO's nuclear systems.

"As nuclear weapons disappear from Europe and the allied defense consensus further erodes, the Soviet Union will be able to concentrate its efforts on politically dividing the allies from the United States and each other."

Most Europeans will oppose modernization of NATO's nuclear forces as an impediment to arms control. One of the key lessons learned from the INF treaty is that the Alliance (primarily the United States) failed to link the strategic and political implications of its arms control proposals. Although the treaty has been warmly embraced by most governments, because it eliminates an entire class of nuclear weapons, the net effect may mean that it will be impossible to attain public support for future strategies that require the retention of "...some nuclear weapons irrespective of Soviet deployments."⁴⁴ This point is more

important in a world where decisions concerning the security of the alliance will no longer be possible without public involvement. After all, economic and political imperatives were primarily responsible for the final outcome of the treaty negotiations.

Implications, Conclusions and Recommendations

Between a man who is armed and one who is not
there is no comparison.

Machiavelli

As is said in the business world, the INF treaty is a "done deal" and it does little good to complain about its failings or to try to change it now. It is however constructive to recognize how the treaty may impact on the future of the alliance and the negotiations in which it will be involved. Ironically, the most significant contribution the INF treaty has made is to bring to light the fact that alliance weaknesses have reached a point that dramatic choices must now be made.

NATO has not survived for over forty years without its share of crises. Following the signing of the INF treaty, a high NATO official responding to a question concerning the recent INF crisis said, "...there is a crisis in the alliance. There has always been a crisis in the alliance. It is a natural concomitant of a union of sixteen independent nations. In that sense, it is also a symptom of NATO's inherent health and vigor. I would be deeply concerned if there were no crisis in the alliance."¹² This cavalier answer is not too different from past reactions by NATO

officials to alliance problems. Yet it is this pattern of a deal to cover alliance problems by relegating them to a process that relies on time to "heal all wounds" that has finally eroded alliance optimism and cohesion and exposed a number of profound weaknesses that must be ultimately dealt with.

The United States and its allies have backed themselves into a position in which they are at a serious strategic disadvantage. NATO's mission of deterrence is essentially the same today as it was forty years ago - to make the cost of aggression prohibitive to the aggressor. Theater nuclear forces have played a vital role in NATO's deterrent strategy, yet the INF treaty has cancelled the modernization of a key element in NATO's nuclear strategy. As a result, NATO is forced to rely on the less credible use of United States strategic forces, or battlefield nuclear weapons that will ensure the devastation of both West and East Germany. At the same time, new and far greater demands are being imposed on NATO's conventional forces. The loss of INF has cost NATO its ability to, "... hold Soviet forces at risk throughout the depth of their deployments giving them the relative freedom of mass and maneuver."⁴⁸ The burden of delivering nuclear weapons has thus fallen on the overworked shoulders of NATO's dual capable aircraft eliminating a number of them from conventional missions to include the establishment of air superiority, considered to be essential in the early phases of a conventional conflict. The result is a return to the situation in the 1950s when NATO relied on aircraft to penetrate Warsaw Pact airspace. But, air defenses in 1989 are

foreign and military experts have stated again and again that to penetrate, ...the most extensive strategic and tactical air defense network in the world.

The cumulative effect of the above has served to highlight the need for improvements in conventional forces. But reliance on conventional forces as a substitute for nuclear weapons will only amplify old problems and may help to create new ones. At a time when all nations are trying to reduce military spending it seems unlikely that any significant improvements in NATO's conventional posture will be possible. The INF treaty therefore forces NATO back into the old box of relying on the Soviet Union to make huge asymmetric reductions in its conventional forces - an area in which they have refused to recognize an imbalance for over fifteen years of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations. In the past the problem of conventional imbalance was resolved by relying on nuclear weapons. But with NATO on the verge of accepting a third zero as a byproduct of the INF treaty, thereby leading to total denuclearization, another problem will be created. The abandonment of a strategy that has relied on the threat of escalation, to include the possible first use of nuclear weapons, exposes Western Europe to Soviet intimidation, coercion and blackmail. As a result, the Soviets stand on the verge of achieving their long standing goal of neutralizing Western Europe. A NATO that must rely principally on its conventional deterrent is faced with only two options; (1) to successfully defend with its conventional forces or, (2) to resort to strategic nuclear

retaliation. For an [American] administration that has so forcefully rejected the strategy of mutual assured destruction, this seems ironic indeed."⁴⁸

Although debate has barely subsided over the INF treaty, new pressure is already being applied to accelerate the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) toward an early outcome. START calls for an agreement on strategic arms aimed at reduced levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic systems in contrast to the total ban on theater systems negotiated in the INF treaty. The risks in moving forward too quickly in new arms reductions negotiations will be compounded by a failure to grasp the lessons of the INF experience. Most of the deficiencies associated with the INF treaty are a product of haste and not necessarily the result of a clash of ideologies between the two superpowers. Although START negotiations are infinitely more complex than the INF negotiations, and are not within the scope of this paper, it only seems prudent that the United States learn from the experience of the INF treaty before rushing head first into another agreement that could jeopardize vital U.S. and alliance security interests.

In the wake of the INF treaty, it is more important than ever that NATO develop a strategy for arms control. The INF treaty is an example of an arms reduction agreement that did not improve security at lower force levels. A new approach is clearly necessary. It must include both the nuclear and conventional

dimensions of arms control in a coordinated program that clearly outlines NATO priorities and avoids "...falling hostage to the hope of further negotiated 'solutions' to rescue the alliance."

ENDNOTES

1. Strategic Survey, 1987-1988, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1988, pp. 21 and 25. These figures are available in numerous open sources. See also Congressional Quarterly, 28 Jan 88, p. 150.
2. Congressional Digest, April 1988, p. 106. Secretary of State Schultz made this statement in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 25 Jan 1988.
3. Ibid, p. 120. Former Secretary of State Vance made this statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 27 Jan 1988.
4. Ibid, p. 122. Statement made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 26 Jan 1988.
5. Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response, New York, St. Martins Press, 1988, p. 12.
6. Ibid, p. 15.
7. Ibid, p. 21.
8. J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1983, p. 9.
9. Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1959, p.17.
10. Ibid, p.19.
11. Ibid, p.19.
12. Stromseth, p.17.
13. Ibid, p.89.
14. This is a restatement of NATO's military strategy by General Bernard Rogers in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 March 1987. National Security Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 1987, p.443.
15. Strategic Survey, 1987-1988, p.33. "Although Schmidt made his remarks in the context of the need to restore balance in both theater nuclear and conventional arms, the public debate soon focused on the nuclear component."
16. Walter F. Hahn, "The INF Treaty, The Alliance and The Failure

of Strategic Realism." Comparative Strategy, volume 7, p.43. SS-20 had a range of approximately 3,100 miles with three warheads, each with a destructive force equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT. There were 405 missiles and launchers deployed in the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union.

17. Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, New York, Random House, 1986, p.30.

18. Strategic Survey, p.33.

19. Ibid, p.35.

20. In 1978 the Carter administration had lobbied the West German government to ask for the deployment of the neutron bomb, if other European countries would follow. Chancellor Schmidt agreed to this and took the lead in Europe. Suddenly, and without consultation, President Carter reversed himself and postponed, and later cancelled, production of the weapon leaving Schmidt totally out on a limb. The Germans had not forgotten this incident.

21. Talbot, p.33.

22. Strategic Survey, p.35.

23. Jack Mendelsohn, "Winding Our Way to Zero," Arms Control Today, May 1987, p.4.

24. Talbot, p.38.

25. Ibid, p.39.

26. Ibid, p.39.

27. Ibid, p.44.

28. Richard Perle, "What's Wrong With The INF Treaty?" US News and World Report, 21 March 1988, p.46.

29. Talbot, p.64.

30. Ibid, p.45.

31. The missiles to be eliminated on the U.S. side include the Pershing II with a range of 1,120 miles, and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile with a range of 1,550 miles. Soviet missiles to be eliminated are the SS-20, the SS-4, the SS-23 and the SS-12/22. Although not covered in the treaty, West Germany has agreed to eliminate its 72 Pershing IA missiles by the time that American and Soviet missiles are eliminated. United States Information Agency Bulletin, November, 1987.

31. New INF talks began following a meeting in Geneva between Secretary of State Schultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. In October, 1985 Gorbachev called for a freeze in U.S. and Soviet INF deployments and announced that SS-4s were being phased out and some SS-20s were being removed from combat status.

33. Congressional Digest, p.122. General Rogers also commented that the entire idea of a zero solution gave him "gas pains" from a military standpoint.

34. William Tuohy, "Bonn Resists NATO Policy on Short-Range Missiles," Los Angeles Times, 11 January 1988, p.18. Woerner left soon thereafter to become the NATO Secretary General.

35. Ibid, p.18. Kohl has stated publically that he does not favor the denuclearization of Europe. The West German Pershing IAs are not covered by the treaty but Kohl has agreed to eliminate all 72 when the Soviet and American missiles are eliminated.

36. Congressional Digest, p.106.

37. William F. Crowe, Jr., "Why The Joint Chiefs Support the INF Treaty," Arms Control Today, April, 1988, p.3.

38. Congressional Digest, p.106.

39. Aviation Week and Space Technology, "Former NATO Chief Calls for Force Improvements to Offset INF Cuts," 14 Dec 1987, p.24.

40. Laurence Martin, NATO And The Defense Of The West, New York, Nomad Publications Ltd, 1985, p.85. Targets include 191 chokepoints and 162 underground command/munitions storage bunkers.

41. Ibid, p.13.

42. The Military Balance, 1987-1988, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Autumn 1987, pp.56 and 215.

43. Hugh De Santis, "After INF: The Political-Military Landscape of Europe," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1988, p.31.

44. Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of The INF Treaty," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988, p.727.

45. R. James Woolsey, "Preserving Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1988, p.70.

46. Davis, p.729.

47. Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of The Threat, 1989. US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1989. p.58.

48. Eric H. Thommes, "NATO Strategy and The INF Treaty," Global Affairs, Summer 1988, p.60.

49. Hahn, p.350.

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